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IPR Was Big Business

by Jonathan Marshall

> If association alone is the test, indeed, it would be easier to conjure up a picture of the institute as Wall Street, rather than Communist, controlled. Some of the influential policy makers in the institute have been distinguished representatives of American business. Prominent American corporations have also been among its leading financial supporters. It is hard to believe that this group, along with some of our greatest foundations and large numbers of individual members, could have been duped to finance Communist subversion through the institute.[1]
>
> —William L. Lockwood
> IPR Secretary and Trustee, 1951

The Institute of Pacific Relations, a multinational group of scholars, businessmen, and other interested individuals officially dedicated to nonpartisan research and common discussion of Pacific problems, for twenty-five years played a central role in the development of American consciousness of the Far East. Its real functions — and importance — have been hotly disputed in the competing claims of ideologically opposed groups.

The Institute achieved great notoriety in 1951, when the Senate's Internal Security Subcommittee under Patrick McCarran (D-Nev.) accused it of harboring Comintern agents and of contributing to the success of worldwide Communist subversion. The Australian Communist Party, on the other hand, denounced the "Institute of Pirates and Robbers" for the hefty support it received from American business interests. Defensive liberals, harassed during the McCarthy era, emphasized IPR's non-political character and clung to the Rockefeller Foundation's flattering appraisal of the Institute as "the most important single source of independent studies of the Pacific area and the Far East."[2] Some well-meaning individuals, in their confusion over the name, even mistook the IPR as yet another pacifist organization, a notion IPR leaders were quick to put to rest!

In view of this mass of conflicting interpretations and charges, backed by only the flimsiest of evidence, it is hardly surprising that much confusion still exists regarding IPR's essential nature. In reaction to the wild charges of the American Right during the 1940s and 1950s, Asian scholars have understandably tended to idealize IPR as a haven for dispassionate scholarship and discussion. Yet, despite the best intentions of most members and associates, the Institute acted in both its research and conference capacities to serve the interests of its upper-class, usually Eastern, financial backers. Even in its origins, IPR was only one of a whole constellation of similar organizations funded and directed for the purpose of advancing the interests of American capitalism overseas.

I.P.R.: ORIGINS AND PURPOSE

The Institute of Pacific Relations originated after World War I as the compromise end of a number of diverse groups

For brevity, each footnote refers to the substantial block of material preceding it. The references are cited in order of appearance.

1. Committee on the Judiciary (Senate), Internal Security Subcommittee, hearings, *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 82nd Congress, 1st Session (USGPO, 1951), p. 3865. (Hereafter, *IPR Hearings*)
2. For the McCarran Committee allegations, see its *Report* on the

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working to promote cooperation and harmony among Pacific peoples. As far back as 1916 Alexander Hume Ford of the Pan Pacific Union conceived of the idea of improving inter-Pacific relations through systematic contact between the region's leading representatives, but his particular plans never matured. After several years delay, the Young Men's Christian Association revived the idea with a proposal to sponsor a Pan-Pacific YMCA conference. Contributing to the favorable atmosphere for such a conference was Ray Lyman Wilbur's massive "Survey of Race Relations," a study of Oriental immigrants on the West Coast. The project attracted much positive comment in the Far East, especially thanks to its distinguished participants, including the president of Stanford University (Wilbur) and J. Merle Davis, General Secretary of the International YMCA. The YMCA turned to Wilbur to head its Pan-Pacific conference, soon to become the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Control of the project, however, soon slipped out of YMCA hands. As far back as 1921, a leading Honolulu businessman, Frank C. Atherton (of Castle & Cooke, Inc.) informed the YMCA that he was "deeply interested" to learn of the proposed conference; soon he and fellow Hawaiian notables such as Clarence H. Cooke, James Dole, and Arthur Dean were placed in charge of a central executive committee to coordinate the conference planning. The group of Hawaiian business and professional men that moved in to formulate the concrete plans for IPR saw the island's political and economic future closely bound up with that of the rest of the Pacific. "Keenly aware of the vast new forces upsurging in Asia," recalls one IPR official, "these men expressed a need for an organization which would concentrate on the needs and developments of the far-flung region washed by the Pacific Ocean." Promoting closer regional cooperation and defusing international tensions through an organization like IPR would obviously be to their advantage.[3]

THE YALE CLUB MEETING

As plans progressed for the Pacific conference, interest in the idea spread beyond Hawaii and California. In particular, internationally-minded Easterners began taking part in the organizing effort. In 1924, a group of prominent businessmen, professors, editors, and political figures formed a temporary organizing committee for the upcoming conference. Ray Lyman Wilbur headed the group. The Committee called a meeting of forty-one "well-informed people of experience in international and Pacific affairs" to meet at the Yale Club in New York to consider the institute plan.[4]



Frank Atherton

The February 22, 1925 Yale Club meeting, in its location and elite Eastern attendance, reflected a shift in the locus of power behind the scheme from Hawaii to New York, home of the foundations and such great internationalist organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Foreign Policy Association (FPA). These and other similar "private" organizations grew out of pre-war "peace groups" (e.g. League to Enforce Peace, World Peace Foundation), wartime postwar planning agencies (the Inquiry), business clubs, and foundations like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All generally favored a postwar system of collective security (President Wilson's dream) based on the predominance of power remaining in Anglo-American hands. Mobilizing mass propaganda power

IPR hearings, Senate doc. ——, 1951. Other right-wing accounts include Freda Utley, *The China Story* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951), John T. Flynn, *The Lattimore Story* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1953), Anthony Kubeck, *How the Far East Was Lost* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), and Ralph de Toledano, *Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1952).

The Australian Communist Party quote is from William L. Holland testimony, *IPR Hearings*, 1223. For an interesting Soviet analysis of IPR, see *ibid.*, 1226-27.

For the Rockefeller Foundation's assessment, see its *Annual Report* for 1943, frequently cited in IPR literature. Note that many liberals formerly associated with IPR today take a different line; they take pains to minimize or belittle its significance. See as an example Dorothy Borg's statement in "Proceedings of the Conference on Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941" (Lake Kavaguchi, Japan, July 14-18, 1969), mimeo. 62. She sees IPR as having "minimal influence" because of the alleged lack of official interest in the Far East at the time. Her statement, however, contains a number of factual errors and serious interpretive distortions.

As essential background to this piece, see David Horowitz, "Politics and Knowledge: An Unorthodox History of Modern China Studies," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, III (Summer-Fall 1971), pp. 139-168, and his articles in *Ramparts*, including "The Foundations: Charity Begins at Home," (April, 1969); "Billion Dollar Brains," (May 1969); "Sinews of Empire," (August, 1969); "The Making of America's China Policy," (October, 1971); and "The China Scholars and U.S. Intelligence," (February, 1972). Also of relevance is G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* (New York: Random House, 1970), ch. 5 ("How the Power Elite Make Foreign Policy"), and a forthcoming book by Larry Shoup and William Minter on the Council on Foreign Relations. Very little work has yet been done on the rise of the American "internationalist establishment," especially regarding the ties between British and American elites.

3. J. Merle Davis, "The Institute of Pacific Relations," *International Conciliation*, pamphlet no. 218, March 1926, pp. 125-6 (note that *International Conciliation* was published by the Carnegie Endowment after many years of sponsorship by the American Association for International Conciliation, a leading internationalist "peace" group); R.L. Wilbur, *Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 315-18; *Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses* (Honolulu: IPR, 1925), pp. 7-8; E.C. Carter, "Personal View," exhibit no. 1382, *IPR Hearings*, p. 5317.
4. R.L. Wilbur, p. 318 and 318n; quote from *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session ...*, p. 19; Wilbur to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 10 March 1925, in 1st Honolulu Conference file, box 1, IPR papers, Hoover Library, Stanford (hereafter, IPR mss.).

(FPA) and the more subtle tool of elite consensus formation (CFR), they operated over the years to bring the United States into its "proper" position as the world's pre-eminent *international* power.

The same post-WWI internationalist impetus lay behind the formation of IPR. The Eastern upper-class bankers, industrialists, academics, and publicists who were forming associations dedicated to peace and the study of international relations in order to preserve a peaceful, prosperous bourgeois world order, envisioned IPR as a Pacific counterpart to already established Atlantic-based organizations:


> Indeed one of the most striking results of the last war and the Paris and other peace conferences was the creation of scores of important national and local organizations whose central purpose was: "It must never happen again." Among the many non-governmental organizations that came into being at that period are the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London [the British counterpart of CFR], . . . the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. . . . men and women from several of the Pacific countries . . . formed the Institute of Pacific Relations as a regional expression of this broad movement. . . . The founders of the IPR were acutely conscious of a whole world of dynamic forces in the Pacific area which had menacing possibilities and which cried out for immediate study.[5]

The Council on Foreign Relations, with its extremely selective membership and close ties to the British power structure, already dominated America's "internationalist establishment." Its pre-eminence was reflected at the crucial Yale Club meeting, which included seventeen CFR members, among them Roger S. Greene (Rockefeller Foundation in China), Ray Lyman Wilbur (President, Stanford University), Raymond Leslie Buell (later head of FPA), and several members of the Tiny elite group which first organized the Council on Foreign Relations: George Blakeslee, Archibald Cary Coolidge, James T. Shotwell, Stanley Hornbeck, and Philip Marshall Brown.[6] A number of these CFR figures were later to play leading roles in the new Pacific-oriented organization.

George Blakeslee (CFR), C.C. Batchelder (CFR), and Stanley Hornbeck (CFR) had prepared a tentative agenda for the Yale Club meeting, which the members quickly approved. President Wilbur (CFR) was elected chairman of the meeting. The members decided that the first international conference should be held in Hawaii, with national delegations from major Pacific states (excluding Latin America). Then they discussed when to hold the conference, the preferred type and emphasis of the program, the manner of selecting delegates, and the desired outcome of the whole undertaking. The participants agreed with Oscar Riley that "the delegates must be chosen with great care" to avoid any indiscretions, but mainly to keep the conference in reliable hands. The Yale Club groups also concluded that the Institute should serve as a forum "for a discussion of those topics which from each national standpoint are viewed with the deepest concern." IPR's program would thus be extremely relevant to the needs and interests of each national delegation.[7]

THE WILLIAMSTOWN MODEL

These certified internationalists expressly conceived of the Institute conference as following the model set by the Williamstown Institute of Politics. The Williamstown Institute, originated in 1921 as a bold experiment by the president of Williams College, Harry Garfield (CFR), held annual summer conferences with distinguished international (i.e. Atlantic area) statesmen and scholars for the purpose of discussing international relations and stimulating interest on the subject in the United States. Like most such internationalist efforts, the Williamstown Institute was conceived and operated by members of the CFR elite who dominated the Board of Advisors, gave the lectures, and led the round table discussion sessions. The Williamstown Institute, in accord with its elite-integrative function, developed close ties to the British power structure represented by CFR's sister organization, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). In particular, the powerful and semisecret British "Round Table" group, which



dominated and founded the Royal Institute, also had a hand in the Williamstown Institute, further strengthening its ties to the upper crust of the Anglo-American elite. Members of the American branch of the Round Table helped create CFR.[8]

5. Quote is from E.C. Carter's "Notes for Cleveland Speech, March 31, 1944," exhibit no. 952, *IPR Hearings*, p. 5066. See also Carter's history of the IPR in *ibid.*, p. 5317, and typescript history in "McLaughlin" file, box 4, Bay Region Division, IPR papers, Hoover library, Stanford.
6. See list in *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, pp. 20-21. CFR membership information is from 1930 membership list, which closely reflects membership in 1925.
7. R.L. Wilbur to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., March 10, 1925, box 1, IPR mss.; *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, 21; "Minutes of the 1925 Yale Club Meeting," February 22, 1925, in "1st Honolulu Conference" file, box 1, IPR mss.
8. On the IPR's conscious imitation of the Williamstown Institute see the Yale Club invitation, 5 February 1925, in *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, p. 19; for similarities in conference organization, see *ibid.*, pp. 17-18. See also R.L. Wilbur to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., March 10, 1925, "1st Honolulu Conference" file, box 1, IPR mss.; "Interview with John V. MacMurray, Assistant Secretary of State, January 22, 1925," *ibid.* Stephen Duggan, who called it "[o]ne of the most potent agencies in arousing interest in international affairs among our people after the first World War," describes the Williamstown Institute in his *A Professor at Large* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), pp. 33-34. CFR members on the Williamstown Institute's Board of Advisors included Archibald Cary Coolidge (editor, *Foreign Affairs*), Charles Seymour, Philip Marshall Brown, and James Brown Scott. Harry Garfield (CFR) was chairman. Other CFR members involved included George Blakeslee (IPR), C.C. Batchelder (IPR), E.C. Carter (IPR), Walter Mallory, Herbert Feis, Sumner Welles, Whitney Shepardson, Paul Warburg, Paul Cravath, Norman Davis, Owen D. Young, and Dwight Morrow –

Besides their similar membership and technical organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Williamstown Institute also shared a common purpose: the promotion of *consensus* among international elites. At the Yale Club meeting, Dr. Henry Pratt Fairchild articulated this sentiment:

> If we are to have democratic action at all, we must have leaders who will be well informed, and unofficial points of view established, based on accurate information. Such a conference as is proposed would be the best possible place for informing the leaders of public opinion of the different countries. My contention is that the only way to become fully informed regarding some of these complex matters is through getting together around a table, and discussing the problems from all angles.[9]

When the Yale Club participants finally made appointments for the American conference group, Fairchild became a member of the Executive Committee, chaired by Ray Lyman Wilbur. Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch (CFR), who financed the Williamstown Institute, sat on the Executive Committee with J.P. Morgan partner T.W. Lamont (CFR) and a Morgan associate, banker Norman H. Davis (CFR; later its president). Other CFR members, including Harry Garfield of the Williamstown Institute also sat on the Committee. Included on the Advisory Council were Mrs. Willard Straight, wife of a Morgan executive and owner of the *New Republic*, Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell (CFR), *New York Times* editor John H. Finley (CFR), Chicago millionaire Julius Rosenwald (CFR), and others of similar background. Wilbur also named the Nominating Committee (to work with the Executive Committee on the selection of American delegates to IPR conferences), which consisted of Rockefeller Foundation official Roger S. Greene (CFR), Professor George Blakeslee (CFR; *Foreign Affairs* editor), and Galen Fisher, executive secretary of the Institute of Social and Religious Research in New York. Ray Lyman Wilbur was himself a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.[10]

THE FIRST HONOLULU CONFERENCE

The Central Executive Committee coordinated organizing sessions similar to that at the Yale Club in participating countries throughout the Pacific basin. Official contacts with the YMCA were terminated, and the name of the organization became firm: the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Central Executive Committee arranged for the opening of the first IPR conference in Honolulu on June 30, 1925. Various subcommittees then handled the technical details of organizing the meeting. Frank Atherton, vice-president and General Manager of Castle and Cooke, chaired the Executive Committee of the international undertaking (as opposed to the American group's organization). President of the University of Hawaii Arthur Dean, who was close to Honolulu's most powerful business interests, chaired the influential Program Committee. Later, when the conference actually convened, the delegates elected Ray Lyman Wilbur Chairman of the Institute and Frank Atherton Vice-Chairman. They held identical positions on the Executive Committee, on which George Blakeslee, representing the Easterners, also sat. Blakeslee also became Chairman of the Program Committee.[11]

This first effort in Honolulu was a distinct success. Approximately 150 delegates from the United States, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii, Korea, and the Philippines met to tackle such issues as U.S. immigration policies, international economic rivalries, and the role of the British Commonwealth in Pacific relations. Frank Atherton saw a great future ahead for IPR and expressed the consensus of the membership in his observation that "the future great events of the world [will] center around the Pacific rather than around the Atlantic" – especially with the expected rapid growth of intra-Pacific trade and investment.[12]

I.P.R. ELITE CONSENSUS

More important than the informational value of the lectures and forums were the personal contacts established among delegation members, both informally and in the round tably discussions. Such contacts allowed members of the different national elites, with few inhibitions, to share ideas and common concerns, resolve differences, and even arbitrate international disputes. Imitating the classic sociological function of a businessman's club, IPR (like CFR) thus functioned to enhance the cohesiveness of national and

the cream of finance, industry, academia, and statescraft. See papers of Stanley Hornbeck, box 444, Hoover Library, Stanford; also Shepardson memorandum, December 2, 1920, in box 35, Tracy Kittredge papers, Hoover Library, Stanford.

The "Round Table" group, which exercised a powerful influence in Britain and throughout the Commonwealth, in favor of a Federation of English-speaking peoples, was originally headed by Lord Milner, and financed by the Rhodes Trust. Its two younger leaders, Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian, Ambassador to the United States) and Lionel Curtis, were frequent lecturers at Williamstown. Curtis organized the Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs at a meeting of American and British peace conference delegates at Hotel Majestic in 1919; later this group split to form the sister organizations, CFR and RIIA.

9. "Minutes of the 1925 Yale Club Meeting," February 22, 1925, "1st Honolulu Conference" file, box 1, IPR mss.
10. The committee memberships discussed here include, for the sake of simplicity, those individuals added at the March 2, 1925 meeting of the American group at New York's City Club. For lists, see *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, p. 22; R.L. Wilbur to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., March 10, 1925 (attachment), "1st Honolulu Conference" file, box 1, IPR mss.; R.L. Wilbur to Mrs. Willard Straight, March 9, 1925, *ibid*; and Wilbur to Baruch, March 19, 1925, *ibid*. On Bernard Baruch's funding of the Williamstown Institute, see Duggan, p. 34, and *Christian Science Monitor*, July 26, 1924. Although Norman Davis never played a major role in the IPR, his connection here is important because of his enormous influence. He made a small fortune as head of a Morgan-affiliated bank in Cuba, and later became Ambassador-at-large during the Roosevelt administration, when he was considered perhaps the most influential foreign affairs advisor. He also became president of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he stayed until his death in 1944. Willard Straight died in 1919 of pneumonia. His wife was an independently wealthy product of the Whitney and Payne fortunes. Her cousin was Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney. As Carroll Quigley notes in *Tragedy and Hope* (New York: Macmillan), pp. 938-939, practically the entire American upper class had familial ties to Mrs. Straight.

 On the nominating committee, see "Minutes of the 1925 Yale Club Meeting," February 22, 1925, "1st Honolulu Conference" file, box 1, IPR mss.
11. *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, pp. 23-26.
12. *Ibid*, pp. 27-40; Frank Atherton, "The Purpose of the Institute of Pacific Relations," *ibid.*, p. 54.

 Although the setting was in Hawaii (not yet a US state), the American presence was strongly felt. The US Navy, then holding extensive war games out of Pearl Harbor, had just announced plans to spend $43 million to fortify the base for Navy use – hardly a move to reassure the Japanese delegation. Ray Lyman Wilbur's brother, Curtis, was Secretary of the Navy at the time. Ray Lyman Wilbur, p. 320.

international Pacific elites by organizing them into a self-conscious *community* of common purpose.

For instance, while official IPR propaganda always emphasized the fact that "There has been no effort to force any one viewpoint" (i.e., no *manipulation*), organization members admitted that "there has been an emphasis on finding the points of likeness rather than of difference." (*consensus formation*). William Allen White (CFR), the famous internationalist Kansas publisher, remarked after attending the first Honolulu conference that the Institute performed admirably the crucial function of bringing together for a common purpose "those who actually rule the Pacific. By this I do not mean the political rulers, but the social, intellectual, commercial, financial rulers who in the main make the sentiment which controls the political rulers." ". . . the more we know," he concluded, "the less we will quarrel." Sir Arthur Salter, a distinguished British statesman, explained that such informal discussions and "contact by people not restricted officially" could make later resolutions of policy in government "very much easier. . . . They help to form the opinion of those classes in each country which may powerfully affect government policy." IPR thus performed the novel task of bringing together elites from different countries bordering on the Pacific, but as another influential British member emphasized,

> Such conferences harmonize not only the views of the different national groups which meet, but also in each national group, the different sections devoted to business and philanthropy. Such increased harmony, based on a study of facts, is rapidly reflected in the tone of the Press and in the policy of governments. Hence the importance of such unofficial conferences as took place at Honolulu . . .

Lionel Curtis, who wrote these words, expressed identical sentiments when he founded the predecessor organization to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs six years earlier.[13]

The elite-integration process in IPR did not function on the basis of equality, but reflected the national strength of each delegation. The American group dominated all proceedings, thanks to superior financial support, larger membership — and the knowledge of all participants of America's powerful position in the Pacific. Britain's delegation likewise wielded much influence, especially in conjunction with members from the Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, New Zealand). China's delegation, on the other hand, reflected the weak and *dependent* status of Chinese elites. Almost all came from the pro-West, modernizing elements, especially those surrounding the YMCA or Rockefeller Foundation. All had to speak English, the language always spoken at IPR conferences, which in itself was of political significance. IPR conferences, therefore, tended to transmit the views of the Anglo-American elite to their receptive and dependent counterparts in the Far East. This aspect was reflected by the statement of a Chinese participant at the 1927 conference, where conversations between British and Chinese members were instrumental in bringing an end to the Chinese boycott of British goods:

> Our little encounters with the British have given us the British point of view, and will help us to understand British attitudes. . . . Our understanding will gradually be reflected, and, I hope, will be accepted by the people in China.[14]

The British were rarely as submissive.



William Allen White

I.P.R.: GOOD FOR BUSINESS

IPR's activities greatly pleased a number of enthusiastic, farsighted businessmen who saw in the organization a means of maintaining peace among the rival Pacific powers and thus turning the Pacific Ocean into the great commercial center of the world. Chester Rowell, in an address to the Conference participants, explained the relation between business and peace:

> Across the gulf which once separated us, reached many arms which, if used aright, will make for mutual helpfulness but which if used wrongly can promote only increasing discord. The chief of these arms is business. Japan is industrialized, China is beginning to industrialize. This is still a capitalistic world in which industry needs capital. America has the capital and the trained organizing ability in probably greater quantities than any other nation. It is accumulating an increasing surplus of these powers which must find an outlet elsewhere. What we are to determine is whether that outlet shall be beneficial or injurious, whether it shall make for exploitation or development. In any event it will make for peace Those who have a stake in a country have thereby a stake in its stability.

Rowell foresaw an American economic hegemony enforced not by old-fashioned imperial rule — those who would impose such an order on the world "would reap the whirlwind" — but rather by an organized concert of Pacific powers gathered together in the Institute of Pacific Relations to promote peace in the region. Together, he argued, "It is

13. Typescript history of IPR in "McLaughlin" file, box 4, BR IPR mss.; W.A. White to R.L. Wilbur, August 15, 1925, box 2, IPR, mss.; Salter, from 1930 annual report of IPR, quoted in Al Parsons, "Philippines: Rebellious 'Little Brother,'" *Pacific Research*, January, 1971; Lionel Curtis to Jerome Greene, November 13, 1928, in "1929, Jan-March" file, box 7, IPR mss. See also Frank Atherton, "The Purpose of the Institute of Pacific Relations," *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, p. 58.

14. On Anglo-Chinese conciliation, see Chester Rowell in *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 18, 1945; IPR, *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927*. Edited by J.B. Condliffe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 198.

for their navies, together with the British Navy, to keep open the ways [of commerce] and to guard the peace of the Pacific."[15] Rowell's vision of an expanding economic community of Pacific nations within a framework of peace was certainly shared by most IPR participants, and not only businessmen. Professor James T. Shotwell, a founder of the Council on Foreign Relations and leading light in IPR, expressed identical sentiments, reflecting back on IPR's Honolulu conference:

> The city of Honolulu lies at the crossing of the routes of trade from Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, the United States and Panama, as well as those of the few ships which still come round the Horn. Almost daily, looking down from the slopes of the Punahou school . . . one sees the steamers coming and going, weaving the web of that new civilization which is forcing its way into the distant villages of China. . . . [Honolulu's] growth and prosperity have depended upon the mutual interests of trading nations. Yet . . . one is reminded that this process of peaceful development which has brought wealth to Honolulu has been working under conditions which were never free from the threat of war.
>
> The Conference at Honolulu envisaged a world where this threat may ultimately cease to menace the aspirations of mankind; but it recognized at the same time that world peace cannot be established by any sudden improvisation of well-meaning statesmen, nor by the temporary adherence to exalted principles or sentiments. . . . One thing is clear to all who took part in the Institute of Pacific Relations . . . and that is that a method has been found which must be used in years to come, if that great migration of Europe into the area of the Pacific which so fatefully disturbed the poise of the Orient, is to find a solution in terms of peace.[16]


FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS

Fortunately for the Institute, this dream of a Pacific Ocean peace organized by IPR was also shared by the leading US economic interests of the day. Indeed, without their generous financial support and vision, the Institute could never have survived (for it was never endowed). IPR's first year budget was $75,000, a sizeable sum in 1925. $25,000 had to be raised in both America and Hawaii, with the last third coming from the other participating countries. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. donated the largest mainland share, a full $10,000. Julius Rosenwald gave $2,000, and Bernard Baruch contributed $1,000 from his Wall Street fortune. Lee, Higginson & Co., a Boston-based investment banking firm, donated $1,000. Thomas W. Lamont (the Morgan partner) and International General Electric Co. each chipped in $500. The World Peace Foundation, initially endowed by publisher Edwin Ginn, granted IPR a much-needed $5,500. The World Peace Foundation, wholly controlled by CFR members (some of whom, like George Blakeslee, were also leaders of IPR), had to delay its next contribution because it faced court action and possible loss of tax exemption for engaging in "propagandistic" activities.[17]

Hawaiian contributors included Frank Atherton, who gave $10,500 (and another $5,000 from the J.M. Atherton estate), Clarence Cooke ($5,000), and the Castle estate ($2,750). Large contributions came in from other equally interested and wealthy Hawaiian businessmen.[18]

In 1926 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace donated $15,000 to show its confidence in IPR (one of the Endowment's trustees had been an IPR member before he died in 1925). The World Peace Foundation contributed $2,000, Frank Vanderlip (who made a fortune as president of National City Bank) gave $1,000, and other large grants were received from the Twentieth Century Fund, the Commonwealth Foundation, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, which specialized in the social sciences. (It undoubtedly helped IPR that Ray Lyman Wilbur was a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.) In later years, big contributors included (besides the foundations), T.W. Lamont, Jerome Greene (of Lee, Higginson), Frederick Schiff, Charles Rhoades, and Mortimer Schiff, all from investment banking families. Ivy Lee (Rockefeller's public relations expert), Frederick Keppel (president of the Carnegie Foundation), Norman H. Davis (Morgan-associated banker), and J.P. Morgan himself were also generous.[19]

With its finances well taken care of, the American Council began organizing itself as a more permanent institution. In 1926 the members formed an Executive Committee, headed by Ray Lyman Wilbur (CFR) with T.W. Lamont (CFR) and George Blakeslee (president of the World Peace Foundation; CFR) as vice-chairmen. Blakeslee also sat on the Research Committee and the Subcommittee on Program of the



Bernard Baruch

Education Committee. Stepehn Duggan (CFR), head of the Institute for International Education, sat on the Delegates Committee and the Subcommittee on Educational Method of the Education Committee. Frederick Keppel (CFR), president of the Carnegie Foundation, worked with Duggan on the subcommittee. Mrs. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. looked out for her husband's interests in IPR on the Delegates Committee. The famous publishers William Allen White (CFR) and Henry Luce (CFR) controlled the Subcommittee on Information and Publicity of the Education Committee. The crucial Finance Committee was ruled by a number of millionaires whose combined contacts ran into the billions of dollars: T.W. Lamont (CFR), Henry Robinson (CFR), Julius Rosenwald (CFR), Douglas Elliman, and Wallace Alexander. Jerome Greene (CFR), chairman of the Finance Committee

15. Chester Rowell, "American Sentiment on Problems of the Pacific," *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, pp. 102ff.*
16. *The Origin and Present Activity of the Institute of Pacific* Relations *(New York: 1927), pp. 20-21.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 25; J. Merle Davis, "The Institute of Pacific Relations," 129; J. Merle Davis to R.L. Wilbur, December 1, 1925, last folder, box 2, IPR mss.
18. Attachment to agenda of February 27, 1927 meeting of American Executive Committee (held at the Century Club, from which significant numbers of CFR members were drawn), file No. 3, box 2, IPR mss.
19. *Ibid.*; American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, *Biennial Report* (New York, 1930), pp. 60-65. Other contribution lists are scattered through the IPR papers at the Hoover Library.

and Treasurer of the American Council, acted as Wall Street's chief conduit into the Institute.[20]

JEROME GREENE

Son of a famous missionary in Japan, Daniel Crosby Greene, Jerome made his first contacts with the East Coast business community while acting as secretary to Harvard's president and to Harvard Corporation between 1901 and 1910. From there he moved into the Rockefeller philanthropic complex, working various as a high official for the Rockefeller Institute, Foundation, and General Education Board (where he stayed until 1939). He joined the Boston investment banking form Lee, Higginson in 1917, and soon became its chief officer. A close associate of the British Round Table group, he helped found the Council on Foreign Relations. He later headed the American Asiatic Association, strengthening his ties to these giants of American finance and industry with an interest in the Far East. Jerome's brother Roger (CFR) was hardly less influential. He had attended the 1925 Yale Club meeting. After serving as a consular official in several Far Eastern countries, he became head of the Rockefeller Foundation Medical Board in China, and developed a close relationship with the American ambassador there, Nelson T. Johnson. Roger returned to the United States to help set up the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression before the US entered World War II. Once described as "the most important private influence on the course of Japanese-American relations" before the War, Roger's close relationship with fellow Harvard classmates Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Grew (ambassador to Japan) ensured that his voice would be heard. The two brothers Greene, each so influential in his chosen field, epitomized the leadership of the American Council.[21]

THE FOUNDATIONS REORGANIZE I.P.R.

Even so, two officials on the Executive Committee, E. Stanley Glines (the Treasurer before Jerome Greene) and C.C. Batchelder (Executive Secretary), failed to win the complete confidence of IPR's Eastern financial backers, who in mid-1926 provoked a significant shakeup of the IPR leadership.

E.C. Carter (CFR), a YMCA man who attended the Yale Club meeting and now sat on the Executive Committee, discussed the emerging conflict at length with four top CFR members, George Grafton Wilson (IPR Executive Committee), George Blakeslee (IPR Vice-President), Archibald Cary Coolidge (Yale Club meeting), and Edwin Gay. All agreed that the two men in question were not "first rate," which they would have to be if the American Council were to "play its rightful part in the whole work of the Institute . . ."

"It is quite apparent," Carter observed, "that in approaching bankers who might be interested in the Institute, that fact that Mr. Glines is a treasurer does not automatically register the Institute as on as high a level as if we had Mr. Jerome Greene as treasurer." Besides the bankers, foundation officials were agitating for some change of leadership. The five men saw only ony possible solution: Glines and Batchelder would have to "drop out of prominence" as quickly as possible. Carter suggested, with the others concurring, that a reorganization committee be formed to create a new, more acceptable Executive Committee. "If we can be assured of the changes that are being proposed," Carter concluded, "I feel very much more optimistic as to our financial prospects in certain directions."[22]

Edward Carter informally took charge of the reorganization process. Personally very close to top Foundation officials such as Beardsley Ruml and Frederick Keppel, Carter was widely respected for his phenomenal fundraising abilities. Meanwhile Ray Lyman Wilbur, himself with the Rockefeller Foundation, had no qualms about letting Carter do the dirty work. After all, Carter's views were eminently sensible; Wilbur too believed that reorganization of the Executive Committee would bring together "a much stronger group . . . with less objection to us from the standpoint of the Foundations."[23]

On June 18, at a meeting at Harvard, Carter, Gay, Wilson, Blakeslee, and Grafton agreed that all members of the Executive Committee except President Wilbur should resign to ease the transition. Stepehn Duggan would head a three person reoganization committee which would submit recommendations to Jerome Greene (for the bankers) and to Ray Lyman Wilbur, Beardsley Ruml, Wesley Mitchell, Harold Moulton, and Edwin Gay (to please the foundations).

"Gay Wilson Blakeslee agree highest interests of reoganization will result if Glines Batchelder and [John Story] Jenks are allowed to resign," Carter wired Wilbur the next day. Soon Duggan had accepted the chairmanship of the reoganization committee; with him worked Galen Fisher and Mary E. Wooley, president of Mt. Holyoke college and an ardent internationalist. Telegrams began to arrive from members of the Executive Committee, expressing their willingness to temporarily resign.[24]

On June 24, after accepting the recommendations of the Duggan committee, Wilbur wired the Hanover National Bank (where the American Council held its account) to announce that Jerome Greene had replaced Glines as treasurer. Wilbur asked Carter to replace Batchelder as Executive Secretary, and also to head the Research Committee in the interim period, with Gay, Blakeslee, and Wilson as his counsellors. Finally, Wilbur brought in Lamont as vice-chairman of the

20. Lists of the Committees (which were in a state of flux around June, 1926) may be found in the loose papers of box 3, IPR mss.
21. *Who's Who in America, 1942-43*; Quigley, p. 955; Warren Cohen, "The Role of Private Groups in the United States," *Pearl Harbor as History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 436-37.
22. E.C. Carter to R.L. Wilbur, June 1, 1926, in loose papers, box 3, IPR mss.
23. Blakeslee to Wilbur, June 11, 1926; Wilbur to Blakeslee, June 17, 1926; Wilbur to J. Merle Davis, June 22, 1926, file No. 1, box 3, IPR mss.
24. Carter telegram to Wilbur, June 19, 1926; Carter telegram to Wilbur, June 22, 1926, file No. 1, box 3, IPR mss. Duggan (CFR) had been a leading participant in the Williamstown Institute. Mary Wooley was an extraordinarily successful woman, as her *Who's Who* biography makes clear. Her ideological position is clearly defined by her work with James T. Shotwell's League of Nations Association and with the Union for Concerted Peace Efforts (which later founded the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies). Both, of course, were directed by CFR internationalists.

Executive Committee to further appease the Institute's financial backers. This "rather drastic" shakeup was accomplished with "great rapidity," Wilbur admitted, but it had to be done. On July 1, Beardsley Ruml wrote Carter informing him of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial's decision to grant the Institute another $10,000.[25]

ORGANIZING THE 1927 HONOLULU CONFERENCE

With the American Council firmly in the hands of people chosen by Wall Street and the great philanthropic foundations, the Institute turned next to the question of arranging the 1927 international IPR conference in Honolulu. Delegate selection proved difficult because of debates over the proper "balance" to be sought in the American group. Carter, who had been trying since early 1926 to place more women in responsible IPR posts, did manage to include a number of women in the American delegation. However, the Executive and Delegates committees turned down his "radical proposal" to include one Black in the group. He had hoped that such a token gesture would prove to the Oriental participants at the conference, troubled by America's racist immigration policies, that the American delegation was sympathetic to their concerns and enlightened on the race question. The committees that turned Carter down argued that any attempt to equate Blacks with Orientals would be a definite insult to the Asian delegations![26]

Also excluded from the American delegation, on the firm orders of Ray Lyman Wilbur, were all pacifists. E.C. Carter had thought it best to keep Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, an advocate of international arbitration, off the membership list until the eminently respectable West Coast internationalist Chester Rowell assured the IPR executive secretary that she was no more a pacifist than such "peace" advocates as ex-President William Taft and former Secretary of War Elihu Root.[27]

The American Council's squeamishness did not extend to businessmen, although not surprisingly it experienced some difficulty in recruiting enough business delegates. Most business supporters of IPR simply could not spare the time to attend a full-length conference; they preferred instead to simply contribute money, secure in the knowledge that the organization was controlled in their interest by upper class Eastern internationalists. Hawaiian businessman Frank Atherton nevertheless thought that more could be done to gain direct representation of the business point of view. A few months before the 1927 Honolulu conference he complained to Wilbur that the proposed American delegation seemed a little "underbalanced from the business side." He suggested that Wilbur approach such West Coast businessmen as San Francisco banker Mortimer Fleishacker. Wilbur hastened to assure Atherton that "We have tried in every way we could to get men of business to realize the importance of attending the meeting. In New York we went over names from all parts of the country, and I hope that we are going to be able to get at least a few representative business men." Ultimately, such distinguished figures as Jerome Greene, Wallace Alexander (president of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., of Honolulu), Alfred Elkinton (president of Philadelphia Quartz Co.), Robert Newton Lynch (vice-president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce), and William Morrish (vice-president of the California Bankers Association) were able to attend. For the next conference at Kyoto (1929), the American Council planned to reserve 15 spaces out of 35 on the delegation for business and financial leaders.



Ray Lyman Wilbur

Atherton also acknowledged the importance of balancing potentially opposed elements of the American ruling class. "It is interesting to see how many there are in the list submitted to us more or less affiliated with the Carnegie Foundation," he observed in a letter to Wilbur. "I wish we could also secure two or three men who are close to the Rockefeller Foundation, since Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. personally, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial have contributed so liberally to our financial budget." Wilbur tried in vain to invite John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and his wife to the conference. Still, a number of Rockefeller representatives attended, including Wilbur himself and Ivy Lee, the famous Rockefeller public relations man (who handled such matters for IPR as well). Three top officials of the Carnegie foundation complex attended — James

25. Wilbur telegram to Hanover National Bank, June 24, 1926; telegrams from Wilbur to Carter, Blakeslee, and Wilson, June 24, 1926; Carter to Lamont, n.d.; Wilbur to Atherton, June 24, 1926; Beardsley Ruml to Carter, July 1, 1926; Loomis telegram to Wilbur, June 30, 1926; in file No. 1, box 3, IPR mss.

26. On Carter's attitude towards women, see Carter to Wilbur, April 26, 1926, 3rd file, box 2, IPR mss. The race problem is discussed in the Minutes of the Committee meetings, April 14, 1927, "April" file, box 4, IPR mss. The American Council included one Black in its 1929 delegation — James Weldon Johnson, author and a former U.S. consul in Nicaragua — who proved to be a big hit with the Chinese and Japanese delegations, as Carter had hoped. See Carter to Wilbur, December 14, 1929, in "1929 July thru Dec" file, box 8, IPR mss.

27. Chester Rowell to E.C. Carter, December 28, 1926, in "Jan 1927" file, box 4, IPR mss. On Wilbur's general opinions, see *Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur*, p. 320.

Shotwell, Alfred Holman, and Henry Pritchett.[28]

THE BRITISH JOIN I.P.R.

IPR conference problems arose on an international level as well. Members from Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, critical of the first conference, "felt very keenly the need for adequate representation of the important points of view of the British investors and traders in countries like China . . ." While many Dominion members understood the general trends in British international economic policy, "they were not familiar enough with eastern conditions to give first-hand presentations of the relations which exist between Great Britain and the Far East." The Dominion delegations, especially the Canadian, therefore began agitating for the inclusion of a British delegation in 1927.[29]

Lionel Curtis, the guiding spirit of the British Round Table and organizer of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, wrote Blakeslee in the fall of 1926 requesting permission to bring an official English delegation to Honolulu the next year. E.C. Carter expressed great interest in such an arrangement, as did a number of unnamed but influential New Yorkers (probably including such CFR-American Round Table members as T.W. Lamont, Whitney Shepardson, and Walter Lippmann); Jerome Greene of the American Round Table was also enthusiastic. According to Carter, these men were "very keen to have Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, and John Dove, editor of the 'Round Table' included in the list of delegates . . ." (The three specified were the heads of the British Round Table group.) Sir John Nelson, a famous publicist and Secretary of the Canadian IPR group visited Great Britain in 1927 to contact Curtis, Kerr, and Dove for possible recruitment into the Institute. Unfortunately, the latter two were extremely busy and ultimately could not attend. However, Curtis headed the British IPR delegation (selected from Chatham House members), and became Britain's representative to the IPR's international governing body, the Pacific Council.[30]

THE 'ESTABLISHMENT' TAKES OVER

The inclusion of the British group from the Royal Institute in the Institute of Pacific Relations significantly influenced the future course of IPR. Not only did it strengthen the hand of those who hoped to strengthen Atlantic-based Anglo-Saxon rule in the Pacific, it also finally led to a purge of the old YMCA-type members who still had a vestige of influence in the organization.

Lionel Curtis, that towering influence in British public life and liaison between the Anglo-Saxon elites, led the fight to reorganize the Institute on the international level. In November, 1928 he broached his plan to two trustworthy American members, E.C. Carter and Jerome Greene. Curtis believed that the Institute in its international function should exist primarily to hold conferences and discussion groups, but, were it left up to him, "in this federal organization the function of research would be financed and controlled by one or other of the National Councils." He observed correctly that "The projects of research on the programme of the Institute are now almost entirely financed from American sources. Under the plan proposed they would also be controlled and directed as they should be from the United States."

Jerome Greene reacted adversely to Curtis's plan to nationalize the research apparatus of IPR, although both still agree as to the desirability of using IPR conferences as a consensus-making forum for Pacific-oriented elites. Greene argued that any move away from IPR's international framework would spell the death of the organization, undermining years of effort. He pointed out to Curtis that the foundations supported precisely because it *was* an international agency. He further advised the Britisher that the plan ought to be taken directly to the organization's Pacific Council, "rather than to use us, another Anglo-Saxon group, as a channel for getting your ideas before the others."[31]

Without waiting for Greene's reply, Curtis went ahead and won approval for his scheme in the Royal Institute. J. Merle Davis, General Secretary of IPR's Central Secretariat and an old YMCA man, upon hearing of the plan, proposed a vigorous counterattack and warned:

> I believe that Curtis will throw all of his weight and that of his handpicked group of Kyoto [the 1929 IPR conference] for policies that will completely change the organization. In conference technique, research, information exchange, publicity and emphasis of the movement, he is out to build a new kind of Institute. A man of his reputation, intensity, ability and drive can go a long way in gaining his ends when he meets an unprepared and easy going majority, if by no other way than by obstructing every move the majority makes.[32]

Curtis failed to further centralize IPR's research apparatus in the United States, though he did force some changes in conference style (to encourage round table discussions rather than speeches). His main goal, however, in conjunction with key Eastern members of the American group, was to crush the last remnants of the "do-good" YMCA influence on the organization, and to focus the Institute's work more directly the solution of pressing political and economic problems in the Pacific area, in the interests of IPR's Atlantic-based members.

Perhaps Curtis's greatest victory occurred on November 7, 1929, when J. Merle Davis tendered his resignation as General Secretary, after being forced out by Curtis, Greene, and Carter using Davis's aide, Charles Loomis, as their agent.[33] Looking back on the incident and its broader

28. Atherton to Wilbur, February 11, 1927, loose papers, box 4, IPR mss; Wilbur to Atherton, March 12, 1927, *ibid.*; membership lists of 1927 conference, box 4, IPR mss. On the Kyoto Conference, see Carter to Wilbur, May 17, 1928, "April thru June" file, box 6, IPR mss. On Ivy Lee's work for IPR, see Wilbur to Davis, June 15, 1927, "June" file, box 5, IPR mss.
29. J.B. Condliffe, "Memorandum on the Relation of the British Commonwealth to Pacific Problems," *IPR News Bulletin*, October 16, 1926, p. 1, 12.
30. Curtis to Blakeslee, August 29, 1926, box 3, IPR mss.; Nelson to Wilbur, March 15, 1927, "Feb" file, IPR mss.; also Nelson to Sir Robert Borden, March 3, 1927, "March" file and Nelson to R.L. Wilbur, April 12, 1927, "April" file, box 4, IPR mss.; *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Organization and Purpose* (July 1, 1928), pp. 9, 13.

 Sir Frederick Whyte, another Round Table and Chatham House member, chaired the British IPR council in 1927. Whyte, and ardent defender of the British presence in India, was a "foreign advisor" to the Nanking Government in China in the late 20's. See *China Forum*, May 1932, p. 20. He was also the biographer of W.T. Stead, one of the chief intellectual influences behind Cecil Rhodes and the Round Table movement.
31. Curtis to Greene, November 13, 1928, "1929 Jan-March" file, box 7, IPR mss.; Greene to Curtis, January 3, 1929, *ibid.*
32. J. Merle Davis to R.L. Wilbur, February 15, 1929, "1929 Oct thru Dec" file, box 7, IPR mss.
33. John N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian*

implications, Davis unhappily acknowledged the profound contrast between the old YMCA-ideal and the reality that was IPR:

> I resigned two weeks after the opening of the [1929 Kyoto and] Nara conference when it became clear that certain Institute trends of which we have been aware for some time are probably permanent. The Institute has swung away from the concept of cultural exchange toward that of a mechanism for handling political and public questions. The tendency of 1927 in this direction was increased at Kyoto. The destinies of the IPR are in the hands of politically minded men and it is a different thing from what was created four and a half yeas ago at Honolulu.
>
> This is an immensely potential change which has given the IPR an opportunity of making history in the Pacific area [But] I have little to offer in the new activities which have developed.
>
> The leadership of the IPR is in the hands of men who don't know the Pacific area, Atlantic area men who have been trained in the European and Atlantic school of experience and psychology. They are putting the IPR back into the grooves and under the handicaps from which the Institute was planned to get away. . . . They are doing just what we determined need not be done — jockeying for control, for building up the prestige of their countries and making the IPR mill grind personal grist. They are making the IPR a society for the study of Pacific questions, not an Institute of Pacific relations.
>
> The Oriental groups are practically negligible in the matter of leadership. *The domination of the Anglo-Saxon groups is so great that their leaders openly justify it and act on it as a working principle*
>
> The General Secretary has been given large responsibilities and a minimum of power to enable him to carry them out. *The direction and control of the policies of the IPR are in the hands of men who are raising the funds in New York.* [Emphasis added.]

Particularly to blame, according to Davis, were Curtis and Greene, the fellow Round Table members. "Curtis and Greene practically ran the [Pacific] Council, moved and seconded most of the motions except for a difference on the Research issue, supported each other in their attacks on Honolulu," he related. [Honolulu businessman Frank] "Atherton put up a gallant defense but was not a match for the combination of Curtis, Greene and Carter."

Worse yet, Greene and Curtis dominated the Pacific Council's Nominating Committee, giving them the power to perpetuate their influence. The only other member, according to Davis, was no more than "window dressing on the Committee and Curtis and Greene had things their own way with the future of the Institute. The Committee appointed Greene Chairman of the Pacific Council. Greene accepted it in spite of the common agreement at the 1927 Council meeting that the next Pacific Council chairman should be an Oriental . . ."

Nor did the situation look any better when it came to choosing a successor to Davis, who resigned ostensibly for ill health:

> An equally serious blunder was the appointment of a nominating committee to select the new General Secretary composed of four Anglo-Saxons — all of whom live on the Atlantic seaboard — two of whom are new to the Institute. The Orientals will have the privilege of rubber stamping the selection by this group of Anglo-Saxon and Atlantic leaders of the new secretary for the Institute of Pacific Relations.[34]

The new nominating committee Davis referred to included the ubiquitous Jerome Greene and Charles P. Howland, Research Secretary for the Council on Foreign Relations (Howland also took over the chairmanship of IPR's International Research Committee from James T. Shotwell, a Carnegie Endowment official and leading member of CFR). Howland had been mentioned at Kyoto as a likely choice to replace Davis; so had Whitney Shepardson, a CFR founder and director and American Round Table member. Instead, E.C. Carter (CFR) won the coveted post. (He also became Secretary of the Finance Committee of the General Secretariat.)[35]

With Jerome Greene in charge of both the Pacific and American Councils of IPR (Ray Lyman Wilbur having stepped down when President Hoover appointed him Interior Secretary in 1929), powerful Eastern financial interests and the cream of the internationalist establishment now more than ever controlled the Institute and guided its policies. No fundamental changes were to occur until IPR's demise in the Cold War.

IPR: RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION

> It is the scientists' business to undertake . . . patient and objective study, it is the business of government and industry to make use of their results in fashioning out of the present whatever future they desire.
>
> —Godfrey Wilson, British anthropologist and first director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute


Although international conferences formed an important part of the Institute's activities, IPR's day-to-day work related mostly to the dissemination of "non-partisan," "objective" information on Far Eastern problems. IPR published books, pamphlets, a newsletter, two major magazines, and coordinated or funded academic research.

Practically every scholarly book on the Far East published before 1945 was printed by the Institute or under its auspices — IPR published 249 itself. Many of these studies required subsidies and would never have appeared without IPR sponsorship. While IPR magazines attracted a subscription audience of only about 3,000, its articles and books reached millions in the form of editorials, news commentaries, and radio programs throughout the country. Lacking other major sources of information, the State Department relied heavily on IPR publications, especially during World War II. ". . . most of the leading American students of the contemporary Far East [have] during the past 25 years been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations in one way or another," noted a top IPR official in 1951. "A list of Americans whose books, articles, or special

Scholars and American Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 5-6; J.B. Condliffe, ed., *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929* (University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 657.

34. J. Merle Davis to Wilbur, Janaury 23, 1930, "1930" file, box 8, IPR mss. Cf. Wilbur to Davis, January 26, 1930, *ibid.*

35. Carter to Wilbur, December 14, 1929, in "1929 July thru Dec" file, box 8, IPR mss. Wilbur left his IPR post to go into government; later he focused his energies on the newly formed San Francisco Bay Region Division of the Institute of Pacific Relations (est. 1928), though he did serve as vice-chairman for the American Council. He also organized the 1936 Yosemite IPR conference. See *Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur*, pp. 602-03.



Some IPR publications

studies have been published by the Institute would almost constitute a Who's Who of the outstanding scholars in the field." Indeed, IPR publications influenced a whole generation of students who still dominate the Asian studies field. No less an authority than John M. Lindbeck, the late dean of the field, recalled:

> When I was a graduate student at Yale, it was my impression that IPR publications, at least during the 1937-41 period, circulated rather extensively among the academic community and shaped the views of graduate students. I know of no other source that was more important than these publications in providing us with facts, interpretations, and grist for the analyses that we tried to write in seminar papers. This aspect of the IPR's influence should not be underplayed.[36]

In view of its extraordinary importance to the growth of the Asian studies field, the question of IPR's capacity for real neutrality and independence becomes critically relevant. To be sure, many different scholars of varying ideological persuasions wrote under IPR auspices — although IPR officials were quick to point out that "no IPR publication" ever "advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs." And few responsible IPR leaders were ever as outspoken as one American conference delegate who argued that "There is a great deal of propaganda needed to stir up [the American] people into taking an interest in [international affairs]. This means that aggressive efforts to penetrate through the barrier of disinterest must be made. Therefore I think we should organize definite propaganda . . ."[37] But in a more subtle sense, could the Institute's choice of research topics and "important" fields of study have biased the direction of scholarly study in the United States? And to whom was the IPR ultimately responsible when making such choices? An examination of IPR's early record raises disturbing questions both as to its method of choice and its accountability to the profession.

THE FOUNDATIONS REORGANIZE I.P.R. RESEARCH

On a fundamental level, because it lacked an endowment, the Institute of Pacific Relations was constantly open to the control and scrutiny of its major financial backers, especially the Foundations which already were remolding the social sciences to meet their needs. IPR officials necessarily listened when large contributors made helpful suggestions. As Jerome Greene once admitted to Lionel Curtis, "we must increase [the Rockefeller Foundation's] confidence and interest in us by making the best possible use of the money it gives us . . ." William Holland, Secretary General of the Institute in its later years, candidly explained that "as an executive officer" of an organization dependent on public opinion "as well as on the financial support of foundations and corporations, I have to be realistic. In particular, I have to take account of the honestly held views of well-informed, genuine friends of the IPR concerning the present-day activities of the institute and the policies which it must follow if it is to keep or regain the financial support and confidence of the individuals and foundations that make its existence possible."[38]

One such "genuine friend" of the IPR was Beardsley Ruml, head of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial which, before it merged into the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929, donated tens of thousands of dollars to the Institute. Ruml saw no reason to allow the IPR to exercise any independence or contribute further to the pluralism of American academia. Instead he hoped to further centralize all significant research activity in the social sciences by integrating IPR into the complex of Rockefeller-controlled or funded institutions. Ruml determined to bring order out of chaos in the field of Asian research.

At Ruml's persuasive insistence, Carter, Blakeslee, George Grafton Wilson, Archibald Cary Coolidge (SSRC), and Edwin F. Gay (SSRC) approached other members of the Social Science Research Council (founded by Beardsley Ruml in 1923), including Wesley Mitchell (research director, National Bureau of Economic Research), Harold G. Moulton (president of Brookings), and Charles Merriam (chairman of the Political Science department at the Rockefeller-founded University of Chicago). With their similar corporate-liberal backgrounds, Ruml knew, these men would understand each other. His plan was to establish "very close liaison" between the IPR Research Committee and a newly formed subcommittee on Pacific questions under the SSRC, whose director would be paid out of IPR funds. IPR would then refer to this SSRC committee "the various subjects submitted to them for valuation, and in many cases for supervision." Together they would coordinate research policy, locate areas of pressing research needs, and "mobilize the best research throught in America" on Pacific problems. Cooperation between the two committees would be ensured by providing for a substantial overlap of membership.

The Institute's continued existence, essentially, depended on its acceptance of Ruml's polite demand. "I am very much afraid we cannot expect any very enthusiastic help from Jerome Greene with Lee Higginson and Company, Mr. Lamont and others until reorganization is assured," Carter

36. ACIPR, *Annual Report, 1939-1940*, 6; Holland testimony, *IPR Hearings*, p. 1230; Lindbeck in Lake Kawaguchi Conference *Proceedings* (mimeo.), p. 62.
37. *Problems of the Pacific . . . 1927*, p. 202; *IPR Hearings*, p. 1222.
38. Greene to Curtis, January 3, 1929, "1929 Jan-March" file, box 7, IPR mss.; Holland testimony, *IPR Hearings*, p. 1214.

confided to Wilbur. "I am fairly hopeful that if you and Professor Merriam favor Ruml's idea of cooperating informally with the Social Science Research Council, we can get an assurance of approximately $10,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation in time to be effective with the [conditional grant from the] Carnegie Endowment.[39]

The reorganization of IPR's research apparatus ended in 1926, along with that of the Executive Committee which proceeded simultaneously. The new Research Committee, more notable for its respectability than its expertise on the Far East, was composed of Edwin Gay (CFR), George Blakeslee (CFR), Samuel Holmes, Robert Park, W.W. Willoughby, George Grafton Wilson, Clark Wissler, and Quincy Wright (CFR).[40]

Thus Ruml managed to win a double share of influence over IPR Research Committee decisions. On the one hand, IPR officials knew they had to be "realistic" to continue receiving contributions from the Rockefeller Foundation — a tendency that foundation trustee Ray Lyman Wilbur reinforced during his chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the American Council. On the other hand, Rockefeller-funded organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations were liberally represented in all decision-making capacities of IPR. As a result the SSRC had acquired a virtual veto over IPR-sponsored research projects. Of course, most of the time there was no real conflict, only mutual coordination; IPR and SSRC officials were too much alike in both ideology and class background to differ substantially in outlook.[41]

I.P.R. RESEARCH PRIORITIES

The first director of the American Council's research program was James T. Shotwell, professor of history at Columbia and a founding member of the Council on Foreign Relations. A staunch conservative and ardent internationalist, he directed the Carnegie Endowment's research efforts while also heading the SSRC Advisory Committee on International Relations. He made certain that IPR-approved and funded research projects were of "practical importance." One study he approved, an analysis of agricultural land utilization in Southeast Asia, was designed to "afford information as to areas available for the production of various agricultural raw materials" such as rubber or sugar. Improved knowledge of agricultural potential around the Pacific basin, the rationalization went, would "be valuable" in "planning national agricultural and commercial policies in the United States . . ." The Research Committee agreed that a study of trans-Pacific shipping would be "practical" because it would "find strong support from business interests on our Pacific Coast."[42]

The SSRC itself, in promoting the "scientific" study of social behavior, likewise demonstrated a marked preference for "practical" research, a bias which no doubt rubbed off onto the IPR Research Committee. A confidential SSRC memorandum on "Research Needs and Opportunities in China" justified a proposal for the intensified study of Chinese industry and economic structure on the most practical grounds:

> Besides their perhaps somewhat academic interest as social scientists in the study of industry in China as part of the study of the civilization of a large part of the human race, Westerners have a very direct and practical concern with what Chinese industry is and how it may be expected to develop. China has been thought of as a vast potential market for manufactured goods and a great reservoir of raw materials. . . . If modern industry should develop on a large scale in China, the character of China's present and prospective economic relations with other nations would be radically changed. It is, therefore, of direct concern to other nations as well as to China to know as accurately as possible what the tendency in China's industry is.[43]

IPR's research program remained in safe hands, even when Shotwell stepped down in 1929. Charles P. Howland, who headed the research functions of the Council on Foreign Relations and sat on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, took Shotwell's place. Naturally, Howland also sat on the SSRC Advisory Committee on International Relations, as did IPR's next Research Secretary, Carl Alsberg, director of Stanford's Rockefeller-funded Food Research Institute. Quincy Wright, Joseph P. Chamberlain, and Lewis Lorwin (of Brookings) also worked for both IPR and SSRC research committees. Carnegie Corporation president Frederick Keppel attended IPR Research Committee meetings, as did other CFR members such as Isaiah Bowman, Edwin W. Kemmerer, and Raymond Leslie Buell (head of the Foreign Policy Association).[44]

These IPR policy-makers, however conservative their outlook, were not as interested in enforcing a rigid ideological code as they were in channeling research activity on the Far East into more practical, policy-related lines of special use to business and government decision-makers. "There is a general tendency to consider China, Japan and India as remote countries which do not concern us in any way," observed IPR-official C.C. Batchelder in 1925, "but we must realize that their economic competition, and the pressure of population will affect us much more seriously in the future than at present."[45] In this spirit IPR leaders sought to find future trouble spots long in advance of the general public (or uninformed government officials and businessmen) and thoroughly study their implications so that potential international conflicts could be overcome before they became unmanageable. Thus the American Council explained that an "essential part" of its program was "to

39. Carter to Wilbur, June 1, 1926 and June 23, 1926, loose papers, box 3, IPR mss.; Herbert Heaton, *A Scholar in Action* (Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 200, 206-14; Charles Loomis to F.C. Atherton, June 15, 1926, file No. 1, box 3, IPR mss.; Loomis to Wilbur, June 1, 1926, 3rd folder, box 3, IPR mss. For more on the reorganization, see *Problems of the Pacific, 1927.*

40. Blakeslee to Wilbur, December 31, 1926, loose papers, box 3, IPR mss.; membership lists in *ibid.*

41. Minutes of the Research Committee meetings scattered through the IPR collection show that IPR-approved projects did get passed on to the SSRC for final approval. See especially box 6, IPR mss.

42. See draft in "Jan thru March 1928" file, box 6, IPR mss.; Research Committee minutes, May 25, 1928, "May thru June" file, box 6, IPR mss.

 Another clear indication of the Research Committee's ideological leanings is its recommendation that IPR improve its news bulletin along the lines of the influential British organ, *The Round Table.* See minutes of the May 7, 1927 Research Committee meeting, "May 1927" file, box 5, IPR mss.

43. SSRC "Confidential" report to Shotwell by Grover Clark, June 1, 1932, in Hoover Library archives, Stanford.

 For lists of other early IPR research projects, see "The Origin and Present Activity of the Institute of Pacific Relations," (n.d., 1927?), box 4, IPR mss.

44. ACIPR, *Biennial Report*, (New York, 1930), p. 25; Minutes of Research Committee meeting, December 20, 1930, "1930" file, box 8, IPR mss.

45. C.C. Batchelder, "The Far Reaching Effects of Industrialization," *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session*, 124.

help different groups in the country to become conscious of conditions that may at some future time be seen to affect them vitally, even though now their import for national or group policy is not widely felt. Inclusive surveys of the research needs for different areas of international contact, like those sponsored by the International Relations Division of the Social Science Research Council, will help to reveal many lacunae in available information . . ."[46] Conflict resolution among the Pacific powers, and advancement of the American "national interest" were the ultimate goals of the IPR research program.

When the first major research grants to IPR came through in 1928, the organization launched an intensive investigation of the political, legal, and economic aspects of the Manchurian problem — which proved most timely in view of Japan's later invasion of the area. IPR took the lead in studying land utilization, food, and overpopulation problems in Japan and China with respect to their implications for international stability. (The Rockefeller Foundation still considers the "green revolution" and overpopulation two of its top priorities for study). IPR-sponsored research on Southeast Asia clarified the strategic and economic value of the area to American officials and businessmen who were just "discovering" the area; the organization's voluminous output on consumption patterns, industrialization, investment, raw materials, and international economic relations in the Pacific had obvious practical implications. IPR also took the lead in studying the possibilities for "rural reconstruction" (the counterinsurgency tactic used by the IPR's own Y.C. "James" Yen who became famous for his anti-communist efforts in China and Southeast Asia) and the potential uses of "population re-distribution" to quell rebellions in the Philippines.[47]

True to the applied nature of its research functions, IPR cooperated closely with the whole range of internationalist and applied social science institutions kept alive by corporate contributions and the largesse of the big eastern foundations. IPR frequently worked with the Foreign Policy Association to produce educational pamphlets on the Far East which inundated colleges and schools around the country. It jointly published at least one book with the Council on Foreign Relations. Indeed, the American Institute of Pacific Relations boasted of its "good fortune to have excellent connections through the membership of its influential research committee with well-established American research bodies such as the American Geographical Society, the Food Research Institute of Stanford University, the Social Science Research Council, the Brookings Institution, . . . and the American Council of Learned Societies."[48] With their common membership, funding sources, and ideological base, these organizations were to bring order out of the chaos of social science research in America.

CONCLUSIONS

> The Institute strives to influence public opinion [and] education in the schools, and to gather information for and to promote common cooperation among the business peoples sharing the commerce and economic life of the Pacific.
>
> —letter from IPR official, 1943[49]

The trends established in the earliest years of the Institute, as already described, only intensified with time. Probably the true culmination of IPR activity was achieved in World War II, when the organization provided trained experts to innumerable government agencies, including the State Department, the Office of War Information, and the Office of Strategic Services. Its comprehensive pre-war studies of the Far East, especially those funded by the Rockefeller Foundation on the Sino-Japanese war, provided valuable background information for the solution of immediate military problems and for the consideration of postwar plans. Its two wartime conferences attended by delegations from the major Allied powers established a unique forum for the unofficial exchange of views between businessmen, government experts, and scholars of many countries. So great were its services during the war that the U.S. Navy awarded the Institute a special medal of commendation.

Althongh in its few remaining years the IPR never again achieved such a close relationship with the US government, IPR continued to act within the framework of these traditions. In the light of its long record, familiar interpretations of the Institute as either a Communist front, or, more reasonably, a mere loose organization of scholars sharing an interest in objective study of the Far East, seem disingenuous. They ignore the motivations of IPR's founders, the reasons for its lavish funding by the foundations, corporations, and wealthy businessmen, the applied nature of its research efforts and the real function of its round table discussions. One need not impugn the motives or integrity of most IPR members to see that the foundations and sophisticated elements of the American upper class "bought a field" through IPR. A classic example of what David Horowitz calls "strategic social investment," the Institute of Pacific Relations for a quarter of a century watched after the interests of the American internationalist elite in the Pacific.

46. *The Educational Program of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations* (New York, 1933), box 8, IPR mss., p. 3.
 IPR backers hoped ultimately to use the organization to influence the direction of research in other institutions along these same applied lines. One US delegate to the 1927 IPR conference suggested, "The research secretary might compile a list of important subjects of the Pacific area requiring research. Such a list could be used by many professors in giving their graduate students topics for study." See *Problems of the Pacific . . . 1927*, p. 204.
47. IPR Secretariat, *The Study of International Affairs in the Pacific Area* (New York, 1936), pp. 4-6, 42-43; Al Parsons, "Philippines: Rebellious 'Little Brother'," p. 7.
48. *The Study of International Affairs in the Pacific Area*, p. 39.
49. Brayton Wilbur to Paul Dietrich, October 1, 1943, in "July-Dec 1943" file, box 13, IPR mss.

ASEAN CAR

Most news these days about the Association of South East Asian Nations concerns the organization's expected shift to international neutrality. But ASEAN is also moving slowly toward economic cooperation. (See "ASEAN Integration," Pacific Research, November-December, 1973.)

The First Meeting of the ASEAN sub-working group on complementation on motor vehicles was held in Manila during November, 1974. At the meeting the five national delegations presented data on their respective motor industries, and the group discussed possible guidelines for industrial complementation (planned division of labor).

It is hard to say how long it will take ASEAN to construct a cooperative scheme. It seems clear at this point, though, that the governments will not give multinational companies such as Ford Motor *carte blanche* to arrange its own complementation scheme. (See Economic Cooperation [ASPAC, Bangkok], January, 1975.)